Mouin Rabbani is a Dutch-Palestinian Middle East analyst specializing in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian affairs. Rabbani is based in Amman, Jordan and was a Senior Analyst for the International Crisis Group, the Palestine Director of the Palestine American Research Center, a Project Director for the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, and a volunteer and General Editor for Al Haq. Rabbani is currently a senior fellow at the Institute for Palestine Studies, a co-editor of Jadaliyya, and a Contributing Editor to the Middle East Report.
THREAD:
On 7 October Israel vowed to destroy Hamas. To eradicate it as an organization. To neuter it as a military force, political movement, and governing entity. More recently Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in true mob boss style, stated that he had given Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, orders to assassinate all Hamas leaders residing in exile.
Fifty days into the war, how close is Israel to achieving its objectives? The short answer is that it requires zero knowledge of military affairs to conclude that
- Israel’s proclaimed objectives are unattainable, and
- Israel has additionally failed to significantly degrade either Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
The elimination of Hamas is unattainable for several reasons. Most importantly, unlike for example ISIS or the European Union, Hamas has – much like the IRA/Sinn Fein or Facebook, in the decades since its establishment in 1988 become deeply rooted within society, and today exists wherever Palestinian communities are to be found. So even if Israel succeeded in eradicating Hamas from the Gaza Strip – or, more accurately, driving it underground – the organization will survive in the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere.
Indeed, the combined efforts of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank since 2007 have yet to succeed in eliminating either its military, political, or social presence. FYI it is now 2023.
Previous campaigns to eradicate Palestinian movements have not only generally failed, but as a rule enhanced their stature. The scale of the current onslaught has catapulted Hamas’s stature to unprecedented levels among Palestinians, and indeed among Arabs and in the Global South more generally. That’s not a challenge that can be resolved by a fleet of F-35s armed with tons of high explosives.
Israel’s extraordinary self-regard and capacity for self-glorification notwithstanding, the elimination of Hamas is a non-starter, least of all at the hands of the thoroughly mediocre Israeli military and intelligence capabilities revealed on 7 October. Let’s for example take a closer look at those charged with assassinating Hamas leaders abroad.
When a Mossad cell tried to poison Hamas leader Khalid Mashal in Amman in 1997, the assassins were caught and arrested by one – just one– of his bodyguards, after a long chase. On foot.
King Hussein threatened to publicly execute the James Bond wannabes, and Israel (in the person of none other than Netanyahu) was forced to deliver to Jordan not only the antidote that saved Mashal’s life but also imprisoned Hamas founder/leader Shaikh Ahmad Yassin.
In 2010, when the Mossad inexplicably dispatched a team of some two dozen agents to Dubai to assassinate a single Hamas operative, Muhammad Mabhouh, they forgot to observe elementary principles of operational security (e.g. hiding their faces from hotel CCTV monitors), and all ended up on Interpol’s wanted list. Their amateurish use of foreign passports additionally strained relations with key international allies, like Israel acolyte Stephen Harper of Canada.
There’s no indication the agency has gotten any better during the intervening years. Unless you’re watching a Hollywood movie produced by Mossad asset Arnon Milchan, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency is not your go-to outfit for a campaign of high-profile foreign assassinations against an organization on high alert. I suspect American and European intelligence agencies are slowly reaching similar conclusions.
Mossad’s domestic counterpart, Shin Bet, hasn’t fared better. Not only because it has been unable to eliminate Hamas military chief Muhammad Deif for decades, but more importantly because Hamas was able to arm, prepare, and launch the 7 October attacks right under its noses, and it hadn’t a clue. While Israel was busy “mowing the lawn” in the belief it was keeping Gaza’s armed groups in check, the Palestinians constructed an entire rainforest in plain sight.
Israel may well get a few high-profile scalps and proclaim the End of History, but the organizational impact will be minor and temporary. Yassin was assassinated in 2004, a time when the most powerful rocket in the Hamas arsenal had difficulty making it across my living room. Its successful assassination of Hizballah leader Abbas in Mussawi in 1992 produced Hassan Nasrallah, Israel’s worst nightmare. In 2006, a daring midnight wartime raid in the Bekaa Valley finally captured Hassan Nasrallah. But there was a minor hiccup: the Mossad, which constantly proclaims itself the greatest and most sophisticated intelligence agency in recorded history, confused the head of Hizballah with a greengrocer bearing the same name.
Similarly, Israel’s assassination campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists has been – to put it mildly – ineffective. Even the 2004 assassination of Yassir Arafat was counterproductive, as it set the stage for not only the obedient non-entity that is Mahmoud Abbas but also made possible the rise of Hamas as a genuinely national movement.
But I digress. How significantly has Israel weakened Hamas since 7 October? If you listen to Daniel Hagari (the tunnel meme celebrity), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (who looks like death warmed over when delivering good news), or Netanyahu, it’s clear there is very little left of the Palestinian movements, their leadership, or infrastructure. Antony Blinken, Jake “All Quiet on the Western Front” Sullivan, and John “Tearstosterone” Kirby, who seem to prefer receiving news after it has been vetted by the Israeli military censor, appear similarly confident.
But once you step outside their echo chamber, reality tells a very different story.
A significantly degraded organization would not have been able to uniformly and simultaneously cease firing throughout the Gaza Strip at the very moment a truce went into effect.
Or to continue firing coordinated rocket barrages until moments before. Or to record, edit, and centrally broadcast video footage of its military operations from multiple locations on a nearly daily basis. Or collect and deliver captives from multiple locations, to multiple locations, during the truce – including deliberately choosing a location in central Gaza City that the Israeli military claimed is under its control. The most important functions of any military organization – command and control, communications, logistics, reconnaissance, PR, and last but not least the ability and will to fight, appear intact and at best marginally affected.
As pointed out previously, Israel has killed more UN staff than Hamas commanders. The same in fact holds true for journalists and medical personnel. And the Israeli military has yet to unearth a fraction of the tunnels found in Hagari memes. It's inconceivable that Hamas has not been weakened and degraded during the past 50 days, or not lost important cadres and commanders, or depleted a significant proportion of its arsenal. But significantly degraded? The evidence for this is entirely absent. The Israeli military is admittedly a highly efficient killing machine, but also a mediocre fighting force, particularly in ground operations.
Wars are not won by slaughtering children by the thousands, or turning Gaza City into rubble and depriving an entire society of basic necessities. The Germans tried this in the Soviet Union, and the Americans in Iraq, and it didn’t end well for either of them.
Many have expressed disgust at the video of an Israeli major dedicating the destruction of a building to his daughter on her second birthday. One could also point out that when a military reaches the point of celebrating the demolition of an apartment building, it should repurpose as a municipal engineering corps and can no longer be considered a serious fighting force.
This also helps explain why the US – by any standard an active participant in this war – and Israel decided to not only negotiate with Hamas, but specifically with Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the 7 October attacks, and to accept most Hamas’s conditions for the agreement reached several days ago.
Before the truce was concluded US and Israeli officials – who previously rejected anything of the sort – explained that it would be an important agreement because it would legitimize a subsequent continuation and escalation of the war against the Gaza Strip. Several additional months on the scale of what we have witnessed this past month or even greater, as Gallant and Hagari keep promising, now seems increasingly unlikely.
To be sure, Israel has an overwhelming advantage in military power. But when a serving cabinet minister advocates using a nuclear weapon against the Gaza Strip (a threat that has yet to be acknowledged by a single Western leader), it suggests the conventional military is having difficulty succeeding. Given its overwhelming power Israel can of course inflict very severe damage on not only Palestinian society but also Hamas. It will almost certainly make another effort to do so in the coming days or weeks.
But it seems increasingly unlikely it is prepared to expend the blood and treasure required to achieve a meaningful military result. Its US and European sponsors also appear to be reaching a point where they would prefer to gradually wind this down before it gets completely out of hand and Israeli conduct ends up damaging rather than promoting their interests in the region. Israel’s systematic, deliberate attacks on the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, and systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, should be understood in this context.
In addition to being motivated by a lust for revenge and desire to achieve a body count many time higher than that inflicted by the Palestinians on 7 October, such campaigns, for example by the Nazis in occupied Europe, the French in Algeria, the British in Kenya, the US in Iraq and before that in Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia, and indeed Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, deliberately target civilian society in order to put pressure on armed groups that superior military force is unable to eliminate. The British after all pioneered the concentration camp during the Boer War for this objective, decades before the Nazis repurposed it for mass extermination.
Given the above examples one might conclude that such tactics rarely end well for the occupiers. They often don’t.
Yet it is also true that the dustbin of history is littered with just causes. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, and despite the colossal imbalance of power, it appears that Israel is increasingly losing the plot. END
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